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he United States cannot defeat al-Qaeda by strength of arms alone.  It must also change 
the terms of debate in the Arab/Muslim world, especially in its radical wing.  How can 
this best be accomplished?  What strategy should the United States adopt for what is 
often called the “war of ideas” against radical Islam? 
 The Barack Obama administration has vastly improved on its predecessor’s approach to the 
war of ideas.  As a result, the global terms of debate have improved since the change of 
administrations in January 2009.  But recent U.S. gains are shallow and reversible.  They fall 
short of the change in opinion needed to defeat the al-Qaeda network.  Moreover, they mainly 
reflect President Obama’s subtle instinct for public persuasion.  As such, they could be undone by 
a change in U.S. leadership.  These gains should be consolidated by embedding them in stable 
policies that will create and sustain favorable terms of debate over the long term. 
 Accordingly, we survey and assess recent and current U.S. public diplomacy toward the 
Muslim world and offer suggestions for improvement.  A theme of these suggestions is that U.S. 
public diplomacy should emphasize dialogue over one-way monologue.  Instead of simply 
turning up the volume of its message, the United States should provide mechanisms for 
Americans and the world’s Muslims to talk to one another. 
 A second theme is that U.S. public diplomacy should emphasize objective facts over 
propaganda.  A third is that U.S. public diplomacy should convey respect to the audience.  A 
fourth theme is that the United States should contest the al-Qaeda narrative directly; an indirect 
discussion that leaves al-Qaeda’s claims unrefuted is not enough.  A fifth is that new 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that address pernicious ideas around the world could 
T 
help defeat the al-Qaeda narrative.  Bringing these NGOs into being should be considered.  A 
sixth theme is that conflicts involving Muslims feed the al-Qaeda narrative; hence, the United 
States should adopt a more muscular policy aimed at dampening conflicts involving Muslims as a 
part of its war of ideas.1 
 
U.S. UNPOPULARITY, AL-QAEDA POPULARITY 
 Foreign views of the United States were broadly favorable before the United States attacked 
Iraq in March 2003, but grew very negative, especially in the Arab and Muslim worlds, during 
the years before the Obama administration took office in January 2009.  During the 
administration’s first months, foreign attitudes toward the United States improved somewhat but 
remained negative overall.  Foreign views of al-Qaeda have also declined since 2002, but al-
Qaeda still enjoys a core of popular support in the Muslim world.  As a result of its own 
unpopularity abroad and al-Qaeda’s remaining popularity, the United States faces a stiff 
headwind in its struggle against al-Qaeda.  Its own unpopularity costs the United States support, 
and al-Qaeda’s remaining popularity is enough to sustain its efforts to find recruits, money and 
safe havens. 
 During 1999-2000, public attitudes toward the United States were positive in much of Europe 
and the Muslim world, averaging 74 percent among those polled in Britain, France and Germany, 
and 68 percent in Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco.  However, by 2005, U.S. favorability had 
plummeted to an average of 46 percent in Britain, France and Germany, and to 42 percent in 
Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco.2 
 By 2007, publics around the world widely saw the United States as a threat to their countries.  
In fact, many people considered the United States to be the greatest threat.  In a poll taken that 
year, the publics of 17 states, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia, China, Russia, 
Malaysia, Nigeria and Brazil, identified the United States as the greatest threat to their country.3  
Remarkably, more Pakistanis saw the United States as a threat (64 percent) than saw India as a 
threat (45 percent).4  In contrast, the publics of only four states identified al-Qaeda as the greatest 
threat to their country.5 Large majorities in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia did not even 
believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.6  
Instead, they widely embraced bizarre conspiracy theories that blamed the Israeli Mossad, the 
American CIA or other dark forces. 
 Public support for the U.S.-led war on terror waned accordingly.  Between 2002 and 2007, 
public support for U.S.-led efforts against terror fell from 69 to 38 percent in Britain, from 75 to 
43 percent in France, from 70 to 42 percent in Germany, from 30 to 9 percent in Turkey and from 
20 to 13 percent in Pakistan.7 
 Foreign attitudes toward the United States improved in the early months of the Obama 
administration, but remained negative overall.  For example, the percent of Egyptians who are 
highly confident that the U.S. president will do the right thing in international affairs rose sharply 
under Obama, from 8 percent in January 2008 to 39 percent in April/May 2009.  However, 
Egyptians’ views of U.S. foreign policy remained negative.  In April/May 2009, 67 percent of 
Egyptians still believed that the United States plays a negative role in the world.  Large majorities 
continued to believe that the United States seeks to weaken and divide the Muslim world (76 
percent), to control Mideast oil (80 percent), and to impose its culture on Muslim countries (80 
percent).  Sixty percent said that the creation of a Palestinian state is not a U.S. goal.  These 
numbers are virtually unchanged from 2008.8   
 Public support for Osama bin Laden in the Muslim world declined sharply after 2002, but 
remained substantial in absolute terms.  In 2007, 41 percent of the public in Indonesia and 38 
percent in Pakistan had confidence that Bin Laden would do the right thing regarding world 
affairs in 2007 (down from 59 percent and 46 percent, respectively, in 2003).9 
 The war on al-Qaeda is not an election.  It will not be decided by public opinion alone.  But 
the negative foreign attitudes reported above matter.  They prevent the United States from gaining 
important help from individuals and governments, and they leave space for al-Qaeda to find the 
recruits, funds and havens it needs to stay in business. 
 Since 9/11, important intelligence has often come from foreign citizens who volunteered 
information.  Ramzi Yousef, the organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the foiled 
1994 Bojinka airliner attack, was captured in Pakistan on a tip in 1995.10  Khaled Sheikh 
Mohammed (KSM), organizer of the 9/11 attack, was captured in 2003 with help from phone 
tips.11  A 2006 al-Qaeda plot to bomb a number of planes in mid-air was foiled in Britain by a tip 
from a member of the British Muslim community, likely saving thousands of lives.12  These 
instances reassure us that the United States has friends in the Muslim world.  They also show, 
however, that the United States would have more intelligence if it had more friends. 
 The harm to U.S. security caused by hostile opinion in the Muslim world is manifest today in 
the Pakistan/Afghanistan region.  Two dangerous setbacks for U.S. policy are happening there, 
both stemming in large part from public attitudes in Pakistan, where the United States is very 
unpopular and al-Qaeda is somewhat popular, especially in the northwest region bordering 
Afghanistan.  First, the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan and poses a serious threat to the 
Hamid Karzai government.  The Taliban is back largely because it has a secure haven in 
Pakistan’s northwest border areas, from which it can move at will into Afghanistan, and because 
Pakistan’s security services covertly give it direct support.13   
 Second, al-Qaeda’s leadership has also found a secure haven in Pakistan’s northwest region.  
It has exploited this haven to scale up its training activities, to support an invasion by its allies of 
Pakistan’s Swat valley and Buner district, and to plan attacks throughout the rest of Pakistan, as 
well as in the Mideast and the West.  With this haven in Pakistan, al-Qaeda can stay in business 
indefinitely and be free to grow in size, develop expertise and continue its search for weapons of 
mass destruction.  Al-Qaeda burgeoned in the 1990s, eventually developing cells in over 60 
countries, partly because it enjoyed a haven in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, where it trained 
thousands of recruits in safety.  If al-Qaeda is allowed a secure haven in Pakistan for any length 
of time, this dangerous cycle will be repeated.  Al-Qaeda will expand to become larger and more 
lethal than it is today. 
 These twin setbacks reflect distemper in Pakistani public and elite opinion.  The Taliban and 
al-Qaeda find haven and recruits in Pakistan’s northwest region because they are popular with the 
people there, while the Pakistani government and the United States are wildly unpopular.  As 
Jane Perlez of The New York Times reports, “Many Pakistanis ... see the militants not as the 
enemy, but as fellow Muslims who are deserving of greater sympathy than are the American 
aims.”14 
 Pakistan’s security services support the Taliban and give al-Qaeda wide latitude in the 
northwest partly because the United States has not pressed Pakistan’s government to cooperate 
fully with its policies.  In turn, Washington has curbed its demands on Pakistan out of fear that 
public and elite Pakistani support for Pakistan’s government might crumble, bringing on its 
downfall, if that government became too identified with U.S. policies.15  America’s hands are tied 
by Pakistani public attitudes.  This is the price the United States pays for being viewed by 
Pakistanis as the main threat to their country and for Bin Laden’s continuing popularity with the 
Pakistani people. 
 Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein have argued that “cooperation between the United 
States and its allies, on issues such as terrorism … has not been disrupted” by anti-
Americanism.16  Conditions in Pakistan and Afghanistan offer important evidence to the contrary.  
Pakistani anti-Americanism has disrupted Islamabad’s cooperation with U.S. counterterror efforts 
in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.  The government of Pakistan will not be a reliable ally against 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban until the terms of debate in Pakistan are changed.  Al-Qaeda must be 
discredited with the Pakistani public, and the legitimacy of the United States must be restored. 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC-DIPLOMACY PROGRAMS 
 Public diplomacy is defined as action toward “understanding, informing and influencing 
foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their 
counterparts abroad.”17  It includes both government-to-people (G2P) and people-to-people (P2P) 
communication.  It comprises a range of activities, including TV, radio and Internet 
communications to reach foreign publics; educational and cultural exchanges; communication 
and dialogue with foreign audiences by U.S. officials; and language training to enable these 
programs.  Five U.S. agencies are responsible for conducting public diplomacy: the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors (BBG), which oversees all non-military broadcasting;18 the State Department 
(DOS); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the White House (through the 
National Security Council); and the Department of Defense (DOD).19  Funding is heavily 
concentrated in the BBG and State Department. 
 U.S. public diplomacy toward the Muslim world includes 11 main projects with a total 
budget of roughly $400 million.20  They divide into five media projects; three international 
exchange programs; a group of micro-programs to support pluralism, prosperity and gender 
equity; language-training programs; and the overseas work of ambassadors and other State 
Department officials.  Some of these efforts are successes, others are dismal failures.  
International exchanges and language training earn especially good marks, while U.S. media 
efforts deserve very poor ones.  The most successful programs are far too small to have much 
beneficial impact.  Thus, current U.S. efforts to shape opinion in the Arab/Muslim world are 
largely ineffective due to either poor execution or inadequate funding. 
 
Media Projects: TV and Radio    
 The United States operates one U.S-based Arabic-language satellite TV news station, 
Alhurra; one Arabic-language radio operation, Radio Sawa; and the Voice of America (VOA), 
which broadcasts in several Muslim-world languages.  Alhurra and Radio Sawa are failures.  The 
VOA is effective but does not broadcast in several key languages, most notably Arabic and 
Punjabi.  Overall, U.S. TV and radio operations directed at the Muslim world are very 
disappointing. 
 Alhurra was launched in 2004 with the goal of providing pro-American coverage of U.S. and 
Middle East news to Arab publics.  Surveys show that Alhurra attracts only a tiny audience and 
has very little credibility in the Arab world.21  An April/May 2009 University of Maryland/Zogby 
poll found that Alhurra was picked by a vanishingly small 0.5 percent of Arab respondents as 
their favorite TV news source — even less than the 2 percent who picked al-Manar, the news 
station of the radical Lebanese group Hezbollah, and vastly less than the 55 percent who picked 
the more mainstream Al Jazeera.22  (Sixty-seven percent of those surveyed considered CNN a 
trustworthy source in a 2004 Zogby poll, showing that not all U.S. news outlets lack credibility).23 
 Radio Sawa, launched in 2002, attracts a larger audience than Alhurra but also has little 
impact.  Its programming consists largely of music with a little news mixed in.  The news content 
is too limited to affect opinion on policy issues. 
 When it launched Radio Sawa, the George W. Bush administration unwisely chose to cancel 
the VOA’s Arabic-language service, replacing it with Radio Sawa.  This bizarre decision created 
a large hole in U.S. media efforts.  The VOA Arabic service served a valuable purpose by 
reaching a modest but important audience — government, business, academic and media elites — 
with important hard news.  That audience has been lost. 
 Bottom line: the United States now has no credible TV or radio networks to communicate 
with Arab elites and publics.  Alhurra is unwatched, Radio Sawa conveys little content, and the 
useful VOA Arabic-language service has been abolished.  Something is wrong with this picture! 
 
Other U.S. Media Projects 
 Three more U.S. government media efforts bear mentioning: making U.S. diplomats available 
to speak on Arab/Muslim media outlets, the Rapid Response Unit and blogging. 
       After the 9/11 attack, the Bush administration at first took a combative approach to the 
Arab/Muslim media.  It often refused to make U.S. officials available for interviews and expelled 
Al-Jazeera from U.S.-occupied Iraq. 
       In 2005, the Bush team reversed course, allowing many more U.S. civilian officials and 
military officers to appear on Arab media to explain, discuss and defend U.S. policies.  These 
appearances were often ineffective, however, because U.S. diplomats felt constrained in what 
they said.  They feared that any remark that criticized U.S. conduct would be pounced on by 
political pundits or members of Congress back home, denounced as “anti-American,” and made a 
pretext to punish or fire them.24  As a result, their appearances had a scripted feel, often rendering 
them unpersuasive.  Moreover, very few U.S. diplomats and almost no military officers know 
enough Arabic to handle an interview in Arabic.  As a result, they are heard through translators, 
which reduces their effectiveness.  Finally, few U.S. officials know enough about Islamic law and 
theology, or about Muslim-world history and culture, to debate relevant issues.  As a result, they 
are rarely persuasive on questions that shape Arab/Muslim political opinion. 
 The State Department Rapid Response Unit monitors native-language media from around the 
world and produces a valuable daily report on this media that helps policy makers understand 
how the United States is being perceived abroad and what stories are resonating in foreign media.  
The report also helps U.S. officials craft rapid responses to events and criticisms. 
 In early 2007, the State Department launched a useful blogging program.  It maintains five or 
six government employees working full-time to answer and debunk disinformation on Internet 
blogs.  These bloggers are Arabic-speaking State Department employees, supervised by Foreign 
Service officers. 
 
International Exchange Programs 
 The U.S. government has long operated two large exchange programs, both widely 
recognized as successful.  Following 9/11, it introduced other initiatives, including a promising 
outreach dialogue program aimed at the Muslim world. 
 The Fulbright Program is the main exchange program of the Department of State.  It awarded 
8,344 grants in 2007, at a cost of more than $200 million.  These grants went to U.S. students, 
teachers, professionals and scholars to study, teach, lecture and conduct research in more than 
150 countries, and to their foreign counterparts to engage in similar activities in the United States. 
 The International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), begun in the 1950s, annually brings 
some 5,000 foreign nationals from around the world to the United States to meet and confer with 
their professional counterparts and to experience American life firsthand.  These visitors are 
current or potential leaders in government, politics, the media, education, labor relations, the arts, 
business and other fields.  They are selected by U.S. Foreign Service officers overseas.  By all 
accounts, these visitors learn and teach a great deal on their visits, especially if their visits are 
lengthy (more than a couple of weeks).  Former IVLP participants include more than 200 current 
and former chiefs of state and 1,500 cabinet-level ministers. 
 DOS has introduced another initiative that shows promise.  The Youth Exchange and Study 
(YES) program has brought around 5,000 teenagers from countries with significant Muslim 
populations to the United States since 2003.   
 Citizen Dialogue is a new program that sends U.S. Muslim citizens around the world to 
engage in dialogue (town-hall meetings and media interviews) with foreign Muslims.  These 
meetings are often run through U.S. embassies.  This program is too young to evaluate, but it 
seems a wise way to use the talents of the U.S. Muslim community. 
 
Support for Pluralism, Prosperity, Gender Equity 
 The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), begun in 2002, oversees a number of small 
programs to support democracy, education, economic growth and the empowerment of women. 
 MEPI is hampered by a conundrum: its main mission is to promote political reform in 
countries run by autocrats, but this would undermine regimes that the United States relies on for 
strategic cooperation.  Hence, MEPI operates mainly in the weakest, least important Mideast 
states.  It does little in America’s closest allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  And most of 
MEPI’s early funding has gone to assisting Mideast government agencies or officials, despite 
MEPI’s mission to focus on civil-society groups. 
 Overall, MEPI has achieved little.  It has the look of underfunded window dressing, 
organized to allow the United States to claim some engagement with the issues that MEPI is 
tasked to address, but without real engagement. 
 
Language Training 
 The U.S. government sponsors language-training programs to teach others English and to 
teach Americans Arabic and other Muslim-world languages.  U.S. language-training programs are 
very valuable, very successful and far too small.   
 In 2004, the Bush administration launched an initiative to teach English to under-served teens 
in their countries, the English Access Microscholarship Program. The program has reached 
approximately 44,000 youth in more than 55 countries since its inception. This is a decent start, 
but only a start, given the vast size of the Muslim world (1.3 billion people).  Language training 
for foreigners is cheap, and the United States should provide it widely, especially for non-elite 
young people who otherwise could not get training. 
 The National Security Language Initiative, introduced by President Bush in 2006, provided 
funds for increased foreign-language training (including Arabic) in elementary school through 
college in the United States and for fellowships for American students to study the Arabic abroad.  
This program is very effective but much too small.  It should be scaled up to several times its 
current size ($100 million).  Quality candidates are available.  The U.S. government received over 
6,000 applications for 367 language-training scholarships in 2007.  Thus it turned away more than 
5,600 people (over 93 percent of applicants) who wanted to help shore up America’s language 
skills, a key U.S. weakness in its struggle against al-Qaeda.  As noted above, the State 
Department and U.S. military still have very few Arabic speakers, most with no better than Level 
3 skills.  These are good enough to translate basic documents but not to conduct regular 
government business, for which Levels 4 or 5 — the highest levels — are required.  Expanding 
the National Security Language Initiative would help correct this shortfall.25 
 
Ambassadors 
 U.S. ambassadors and other State Department officials do important work shaping debate and 
perceptions abroad.  Their foreign placement allows them to learn local cultures and develop 
relationships that can help them be heard when the need arises.  Funding for their activities is 
notoriously meager, however, especially when compared to the Defense Department and other 
security agencies.  The DOD budget was 34 times the size of the State Department budget in 
2008.26  There are more musicians in U.S. military bands than there are foreign service officers in 
the State Department.  Again, there is something wrong with this picture. 
 
IMPROVING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
  The following suggestions emerge from America’s public-diplomacy experience.  Several 
have a common theme: public diplomacy should usually be conducted as a dialogue, not a 
monologue.  Dialogue makes the audience feel heard, which primes the audience to consider the 
speaker’s message. It also helps the audience to educate the speaker about its concerns, and this 
helps the speaker focus discussion on the real interests of the audience.  U.S. public diplomacy 
has often assumed a monologue format in recent years.  Instead, the United States should focus 
on creating a two-way exchange of ideas. 
  
More Listening 
 The United States should discern the views of target audiences before developing programs to 
address them.27  Past U.S. programs have sometimes faltered because the Americans talked 
before listening.  For example, the U.S. Shared Values Initiative of 2001-02, which featured TV 
ads that touted the high quality of life enjoyed by Muslims in America, was nicely produced but 
addressed a question that the Muslim world was not asking.28  Muslims around the world were 
concerned with U.S. policies toward the Muslim world, not with conditions of life for U.S. 
Muslims.  The “Shared Values” campaign talked past them.29 
 
Re-brand the Wars 
 The United States should re-label its main counterterror efforts to avoid confusing itself and 
muddling its message overseas.   The “war on terror” should become the “war on al-Qaeda”; the 
“war of ideas” should become the “dialogue of ideas.” 
 “War on terror” misleads Americans by defining too many players — all of the world’s many 
terrorist groups — as adversaries.  It mixes real enemies with neutrals or non-enemies (all 
terrorists do not threaten the United States), leading Americans to believe they must fight non-
adversaries.  It also fails to set priorities.  Some hostile terrorists are far more dangerous than 
others, but a call to a “war on terror” suggests an equivalence among them. 
 The “war on terror” label obscures the potential of a divide-and-conquer strategy toward 
hostile groups.  Assigning these groups a common framing masks the conflicts among them.  A 
divide-and-conquer strategy has promise because internecine conflicts among extremist groups 
often run deep.  For example, some elements of the extremist Sunni Muslim community voice 
more hatred of Shia Muslims than of Jews or Christians.30  A smart U.S. strategy could exploit 
this hatred to weaken extremists among both Shia and Sunni, and the United States should use 
concepts that remind us of this possibility.31  “War on terror” fails to do this. 
 “War of ideas” should be dropped in favor of “dialogue of ideas” or “engagement of ideas.”  
The word “war” connotes one side’s winning or losing, imposing its will on another, and using 
force to do it.  To Arabs and Muslims, “war of ideas” suggests a war on their ideas, their religion 
and their culture.  Using language that carries this hostile undertone is a poor way to start a 
conversation.  In contrast, “dialogue” or “engagement” implies equality among parties, respect 
for the opinions of both sides, a conversation instead of a monologue, and an effort to find 
solutions that serve the interests of both sides.  Muslims will join a “dialogue of ideas” with more 
open minds than a “war of ideas.” 
 
Bring People Together 
 Experts widely agree that the Fulbright and International Visitor Leader Programs and similar 
people-to-people exchange initiatives have been great successes and should be expanded.32  Giles 
Scott-Smith notes that exchange programs are “an oft-neglected but arguably the most successful 
element of public diplomacy.”33  He adds that U.S. Foreign Service officers have consistently 
reported that exchange programs are “one of the most effective means to influence opinion 
abroad.  In particular, U.S. ambassadors rate the IVLP as the most useful of all public diplomacy 
tools available to them.”34  The experience of other countries confirms these judgments.  For 
example, Franco-German exchanges after World War II are widely deemed an important 
ingredient to Franco-German rapprochement.35  This evidence makes clear that the United States 
should greatly increase its investment in exchange programs. 
 
Increase Language Training 
 The United States should teach English to more Muslim-world citizens.  This would prepare 
them to participate in exchanges and ease U.S. government efforts to engage in direct dialogue 
with ordinary citizens.  More important, the U.S. should teach Muslim-world languages to many 
more Americans.  Teaching Muslim-world languages to Americans would provide the 
government with more multilingual talent for public-diplomacy activities and better prepare 
ordinary Americans to understand and have dialogue with the Muslim world, including 
participation in exchanges.   
 
Improve U.S. Broadcasting 
 Current U.S. broadcast media aimed at the Arab world (Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa) are 
largely ineffective.  They should be remade, and the VOA Arabic Service should be restored.36 A 
remade U.S. media should observe two public-diplomacy best practices: Socratic dialogue over 
monologue, and objective facts over polemics. 
 Recent U.S. public-diplomacy media efforts have favored monologue over give-and-take 
discussion.  On Alhurra, recorded broadcasts have predominated over talk shows and call-in 
programs, and Radio Sawa has no political talk shows.  All evidence indicates that this is the 
wrong approach.  Monologue format is less effective than dialogue.  People listen better to people 
who listen to them, and people listen better when they are also allowed to speak.  Geoffrey 
Cowan and Amelia Arsenault observe that “the need to be heard is a fundamental characteristic of 
human nature,” and “a century of communication research demonstrates that the need to be heard 
represents an almost universal human characteristic.”37  As they note, democratization researchers 
report that “individuals are more likely to feel favorably toward those with opposing viewpoints 
and consider political outcomes fair ... if they have the opportunity to engage in discussion and 
debate.”38  Accordingly, a reformed U.S. broadcasting operation should feature dialogue over 
one-way monologue. 
 This requires empowering U.S. ambassadors and other officials to engage in debate about 
history and current U.S. policy — and protecting them from attack by domestic primitives.  Many 
U.S. officials are understandably leery of leading Socratic dialogue because a small slip on 
camera can cause a career-ending firestorm at home.  Hence, a high-level presidential 
commitment to insulate U.S. officials from domestic attack, and to counterattack on their behalf, 
is required. 39   
 The United States should reformat its media to offer more objective news, with fewer 
polemics or one-sided arguments.  For example, British public-diplomacy broadcasting has long 
emphasized objective news, as heard on the BBC.  In contrast, U.S. public diplomacy has 
emphasized advocacy.  This is a mistake for two reasons.  First, successful persuasion requires a 
credible messenger, and credibility is best earned by offering accurate, objective information.40  
Second, in the war between the United States and al-Qaeda, facts are more often America’s friend 
than foe.  Bin Laden is, in fact, a bad guy.  Al-Qaeda is a bad outfit with a bad program; it does 
bad deeds.  Authoritarian Islamist rule has been a cruel failure in Afghanistan, Sudan and Iran.  
The United States is not out to destroy Islam.  Objective facts favor the United States, so U.S. 
public diplomacy should favor formats that feature objective facts. 
 U.S. broadcasting also needs better management.  Recent U.S. broadcasting has failed partly 
because the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is poorly run.  Appointments to the eight-
member board that runs it have often been awarded as perks to political friends of those making 
appointments.  As a result, the BBG has become a headless horseman, independent of outside 
control but poorly managed from within. In recent years, influential board member Norman Pattiz 
was allowed wide latitude to make poor decisions without debate or accountability for results.  
High-quality professionals with experience in public diplomacy should be appointed to all BBG 
board posts, and the BBG should be held to high standards of performance.41 
 
Involve American Muslims 
 U.S. public diplomacy should not focus solely on foreign audiences but also include 
American Muslims in the discussion.  The U.S. Muslim community has valuable language and 
cultural skills that should be fully mobilized to support U.S. public diplomacy and other national-
security programs abroad.  Conversely, U.S. Muslim communities could provide havens for al-
Qaeda cells if they became alienated from society, like some Muslim communities in Europe.  To 
maintain the support of the Muslim community and mobilize its skills, the U.S. government must 
be in close two-way communication with U.S. Muslim communities and quickly address any 
concerns and grievances that stem from security measures (such as anti-Muslim profiling in 
airports) or private discrimination against Muslims. 
 
Be Specific 
 U.S. public diplomacy should be tailored to individual foreign audiences.  Communities are 
different.  When it comes to public diplomacy, one size does not fit all.  Accordingly, U.S. public 
diplomacy should speak separately to the unique beliefs and worries of each foreign Muslim 
community.  A tailored message of this sort will better connect to each community’s concerns.  It 
also conveys respect.  
 A dialogue format makes it easier to tailor public diplomacy in this fashion.  Dialogue creates 
opportunities for communities to educate the United States about their unique concerns, which in 
turn helps the United States to address them. 
 
Improve Muslim-World and U.S. Education 
 Extremist Muslim religious schools have been a conduit for the al-Qaeda narrative in parts of 
the Muslim world.42  Accordingly, the United States should put a priority on moderating their 
curricula or putting them out of business.  Such schools often exist because public schools are 
deficient and overseas (often Saudi) funders are available.  The United States can improve this 
situation by helping governments to provide better public education, which can then replace the 
extremist schools.  It should also press foreign donors directly or through their governments to 
stop donating.43 
 The U.S. government can also directly educate the Muslim world by reviving its American 
cultural centers and their libraries.  Important dialogue between Americans and non-Americans 
formerly took place at American cultural centers in foreign countries run by U.S. foreign-service 
officers.  Non-Americans also learned a great deal at American cultural-center libraries.  The 
books in many of these libraries were famously dog-eared from overuse.  Partly for security 
reasons, these centers have been largely replaced by more anodyne American Corners, displays of 
Americana that are tucked away in local schools or libraries and have no American staff to 
engage visitors. But the problem of securing American cultural centers is not insurmountable, and 
they should be reopened.44 
 Education in the United States also needs improvement.  To engage in dialogue with those 
from the Muslim world, Americans must know something about its culture and history.  
Americans know very little, however, because U.S. education on these subjects is woefully thin.  
This should change.  A broad increase in education on the Muslim world is needed in American 
secondary and higher education. 
 
Improve Trade and Aid Policies 
    ▪ Reduce trade barriers against textile and food imports from Pakistan, Indonesia and other 
Arab/Muslim countries.  This will cause workers who produce food and textiles to feel more in 
partnership with the United States, while raising their standard of living and reducing costs for 
U.S. consumers. 
     ▪ Don’t object to Arab/Muslim import restrictions on U.S. entertainment products (TV, films 
and music).  Many Arabs and Muslims are offended by the materialism, hedonism, pornography 
and violence that saturate these media.  They resent its corrosive effect on their traditional social 
values.45  The U.S. alienates potential friends by forcing these products on Muslim societies. 
     ▪ Offer prompt and generous relief in the wake of calamitous natural disasters, such as the 
2004 Indonesian tsunami and the 2005 Pakistani earthquake.  Aid given in times of greatest 
trauma is especially appreciated and long remembered.  U.S. aid to the victims of the tsunami 
caused a marked improvement in Indonesian views of the United States.46  Such aid should not be 
an ad-hoc response, but a standing policy. 
     ▪ Publicize U.S. humanitarian and economic aid to Arab/Muslim countries.  This modest aid is 
largely invisible to Muslim publics, partly because USAID is generally prohibited from using 
program funds to publicize its aid efforts.47  As a result, Muslim publics greatly underestimate the 
scope of U.S. aid.48  Effort should be made to take public credit for aid given. 
 
Increase Funding and Improve Leadership 
 Money invested in shaping foreign opinion yields a good return if it is spent wisely, but the 
United States now spends very little on the mission.  This is penny-wise and pound-foolish.  In 
FY 2008, the United States spent only $1.6 billion on public diplomacy worldwide.49  In contrast, 
it spent $8.4 billion per month on the Iraq war in early 2009.50  Thus, what it spends on public 
diplomacy in a year, it spent in six days in Iraq.51  Moreover, while current figures are 
unavailable, those from 2003 suggest that only about one-quarter of State Department public 
diplomacy spending is directed at Muslim-majority states.52 
 U.S. public-diplomacy efforts have also been poorly led.  The first post-9/11 director of the 
State Department Office of Public Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers, was a poor fit for the job.  The 
second, Margaret Tutwiler, left after a brief tour of duty.  The third director, Karen Hughes, was 
allowed to defer her arrival for months while the job sat empty, then left in 2007.  This musical-
chairs leadership reflected a failure by the Bush team to put priority on waging a forceful war of 
ideas.53  Future U.S. administrations should put first-rate leaders in charge of this essential 
mission. 
 
Create a State Department Bureau of Public Diplomacy 
 Public diplomacy is a distinct mission requiring special skills and training that are not needed 
for government-to-government (G2G) diplomacy (and vice-versa).54  Accordingly, the work 
should be performed largely by dedicated public-diplomacy officers who have special training 
and skills and are judged for promotion based specifically on their performance in public-
diplomacy functions.  Toward this goal, a semi-autonomous Bureau of Public Diplomacy should 
be established within the State Department.55  Public-diplomacy specialists should be collected in 
this bureau (they are now scattered through the State Department, where their public-diplomacy 
skills atrophy as they work on other matters); and a new assistant secretary of state for public 
diplomacy should be given authority over their hiring, training, promotion, assignments and 
budgets. Most State Department public diplomacy should be assigned to these officers, who 
should spend most of their time doing this work. 
 Before 1999, most U.S. public diplomacy was conducted by the U.S. Information Agency 
(USIA).  Due to unwise pressure from Congress, the USIA was absorbed into the State 
Department in 1999.  This merger was a serious mistake.  It cannot now be easily undone, but 
much of the damage could be abated by uniting public-diplomacy officers in a new bureau.  This 
step would restore professionalism to U.S. public diplomats and make their work far more 
effective. 
 In addition, the primacy of the State Department over public diplomacy should be restored.  
In recent years the Department of Defense has developed its own public-diplomacy activities.  
These have not been successful.  Instead the DOD should be confined to its traditional limited 
role of conducting psychological operations (“psyops”) against wartime enemies.56 
 
Convey Respect 
 Arabs and other Muslims widely believe that Americans view them with disrespect.57  This is 
a prime cause of Arab/Muslim anger toward the United States.  Accordingly, the format and 
content of U.S. communication toward the Muslim world should be redesigned to convey respect. 
Dialogue should be favored over monologue, as discussed above, partly because dialogue 
requires listening, and listening shows respect.  Objective news should be favored over polemics 
in U.S. broadcasts, partly because polemics suggest that the broadcaster thinks the audience is too 
stupid to recognize propaganda for what it is. 
 
Address Arab/Muslim Interests   
 As a general matter, the United States should adapt its foreign policy to reflect the concerns 
of the peoples of the Arab/Muslim world.  Even the best public diplomacy cannot defend foreign 
policies that damage others’ core interests.  The United States has hurt its standing in the 
Arab/Muslim world by supporting unpopular authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere, and by giving unconditional support to Israel, which implicates the American people 
in Israel’s much-hated expansionism.  Such policies are very hard to justify to Arab/Muslim 
publics.  Instead, the United States should gently favor pluralism and good governance in the 
Arab world, and strongly back Israel within its 1967 borders but strongly oppose Israeli 
expansion beyond those borders, including all Israeli settlement activity in contested areas.  Only 
in extremis should it attack, invade or occupy Arab and Muslim states, as U.S. uses of force 
against Muslims provoke great resentment.  
 President Obama gestured toward these policies in his dramatic June 4, 2009, speech at Cairo 
University.  Now he should follow through. 
 
FURTHER SUGGESTIONS 
Contest the al-Qaeda Narrative 
 To date, the U.S. government has largely sidestepped direct debate about the validity of the 
al-Qaeda narrative.  Instead, the United States should move to challenge and destroy it. This 
narrative is highly compelling and widely believed in large parts of the Muslim world.58  It 
motivates many to join or support the movement.  As long as it has traction in Muslim societies, 
al-Qaeda will have fertile ground to find recruits, money and haven. 
 The United States should contest this narrative because it is both dangerous and flimsy, 
resting on claims that are usually debatable and often patently false.  As such, it is highly 
vulnerable to attack.  Moreover, al-Qaeda will endure as long as its narrative remains intact.  And 
its narrative will remain as long as it goes uncriticized.  
 Some argue that a debate over al-Qaeda’s narrative would happen on al-Qaeda’s terms and 
could never be won.  But the greater danger lies in ducking the debate.  Even implausible 
arguments are believed if they are not answered.  Accordingly, al-Qaeda’s arguments will be 
accepted by many if they are not refuted. 
 The al-Qaeda narrative has a theological chapter and a historical chapter.  Both chapters 
should be countered. 
 
Theology  
 Al-Qaeda’s theology has six elements: salafist roots, the militarization of jihad, the elevation 
of jihad, the framing of vast imperial aims, and justification for the killing of both civilians and 
Muslims.  All six elements are departures from mainstream Muslim belief. 
     ▪  Salafist roots. Al-Qaeda thinkers embrace the puritanical Sunni salafist tradition that seeks 
to return the Muslim world to the social and religious practice of the time of Mohammed.  Salafis 
hold that the rules of government and society should be based solely on their particular literalist 
reading of the Quran, the Hadith and the Sharia.  Unlike mainstream Muslims, they therefore 
reject all Western social ideas and inventions, including democracy, constitutions, human rights, 
personal freedom, international law and Western economic concepts.59  Al-Qaeda adopts this 
salafi worldview. 
     ▪  Militarization and elevation of jihad.  “Jihad” is an Arabic term meaning “struggle toward 
good” or “striving in the way of God.”  Mainstream Muslims recognize two types of jihad: an 
internal struggle to be a good person (the greater jihad) and an external struggle to defend Islam 
against injury or attack (the lesser jihad).  The struggle to be a good person is considered the more 
important of the two.  The lesser jihad requires defending Islam, by force if necessary, but 
includes no duty to wage aggressive war.  In fact, aggressive war is forbidden by mainstream 
Muslim theology. Both jihad duties are subordinate to the five pillars of Sunni Islam.60 
 Al-Qaeda thinkers invert mainstream Islam by elevating the duty to defend the faith above 
the duty to be a good person.61  In this way they militarize the concept of jihad.  They also elevate 
jihad itself to exalted status, at the same level as the five pillars of traditional mainstream Islam.62  
And they vastly expand the lesser jihad to include three elements excluded or forbidden by 
mainstream Islam: expansionist wars of aggression, and the mass killing of noncombatants and 
Muslims. 
     ▪  Framing of imperial aims. Al-Qaeda thinkers use two devices to expand the lesser jihad to 
both allow and require aggressive war.63  First, they define any place that was ever ruled by 
Muslims or ever had a significant Muslim population to be “Muslim” land today.  They then hold 
that if these lands are not now governed by Muslim rulers, they are under attack and must be 
defended, by force if necessary.  The mainstream Muslim rule against waging aggressive war is 
thereby replaced by a de facto requirement to use force to spread Muslim rule.64 
 A vast swath of the world is targeted by this legerdemain.  All of Spain (“al-Andalus”), the 
Balkans, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, India, Nepal, Burma, the Philippines, East Timor, 
Eritrea, all of Israel, Lebanon and Russia (on grounds that Russian leaders once paid tribute to 
Muslim Tatars) are defined as “Muslim land” by various jihadi thinkers.65  The allies of the 
“attackers” who now occupy these “Muslim lands” are also legitimate targets, as they assist the 
alleged attack.  Overall, much of the planet is fair game.  Al-Qaeda’s theoreticians have 
manufactured a warrant for an immense global war of aggression. 
 In addition, al-Qaeda thinkers define “aggression” against Islam to include the mere existence 
of competing ideologies, rather than physical attack by another group or state.  Thus Sayyid Qutb, 
a key source of ideas for al-Qaeda, argued that “we must change the meaning of the word 
‘defense’ and mean by it ‘the defense of man’ against all those elements that limit his freedom,” 
to include “beliefs and concepts.”66  This truer understanding of Islam requires the global spread 
of Muslim rule — “the establishment of the sovereignty of God and His Lordship throughout the 
world,” as Qutb put it.67 
     ▪  Justifying the killing of civilians and Muslims.  Al-Qaeda thinkers allow, even require, the 
mass killing of noncombatants during wartime.  Osama bin Laden has proclaimed that “to kill 
Americans, ... civilian and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any 
country in which it is possible.”68  An al-Qaeda press spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, claimed 
a right for al-Qaeda to kill four million Americans, including two million children.69  Al-Qaeda 
thinkers have argued that Islam permits the vast killing of civilians that the use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) would cause,70 and Osama bin Laden has unambiguously promised to 
use WMD if he can.71 
 Al-Qaeda also expands jihad to allow violence, including mass violence, against other 
Muslims.72  Mainstream Islam forbids this.  Al-Qaeda thinkers draw on the writing of early salafi 
writer Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) to evade this rule.73  Ibn Taymiyya advanced the doctrine of 
takfir, holding that people who do not follow the correct (salafi) interpretation of Islam or support 
political regimes that govern against Muslim law can be declared takfir, i.e., no longer Muslim.  
Such persons then may be killed, even though they consider themselves Muslim.  This argument 
allows al-Qaeda to direct its violence against Muslims as well as non-Muslims.74 
 By these devices al-Qaeda defines much of humanity to be a permissible, even mandatory, 
target for violence.  A mainstream Islam that forbids aggressive war, the killing of non-
combatants and the killing of other Muslims has been distorted into its polar opposite. 
 
History 
 The al-Qaeda historical narrative features the claim that the West has waged an unprovoked 
and unrelenting war of aggression against a peaceful Muslim world since the time of Mohammed.  
Events mentioned as episodes in this aggressive war include the Crusades; the brutal colonization 
of Muslims by the British, French, Russians, Italians and Americans from the eighteenth century 
to the 1960s; the destruction of the caliphate after World War I; and the establishment of Israel in 
1948.  More recent episodes include the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia (1992-94);75 
alleged U.S. support for the murder and expulsion of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs in the early 
1990s;76 Western support for the independence of East Timor from Indonesia (1999), which “tore 
apart Indonesia and deported the Muslims of Timor”;77 alleged U.S. support for India’s 
oppression of Muslims in Kashmir and for Russian oppression of Muslim Chechens;78 the alleged 
U.S. killing of many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis by economic sanctions directed at Saddam 
Hussein’s regime from 1991 to 2001;79 the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); 
and U.S. support for Israel’s many military actions against Arabs since 1948.80  An al-Qaeda 
propaganda film summarizes the damage allegedly done by this aggression: “Today the entire 
Muslim nation is subject to the tyranny and oppression of ... Crusader disbelief.”81  As Western 
motives, al-Qaeda asserts that the United States does not value the lives of Muslims and that it 
seeks to destroy Islam and control its oil. Al-Qaeda claims that its violence protects Muslims 
from this aggression. 
 
Assessing the Narrative 
 The theological chapter of the narrative cannot be judged “right” or “wrong,” as it rests on 
belief, not facts.  But it can be deemed highly deviant from the mainstream Muslim understanding 
of Islam. 
 The historical chapter of the al-Qaeda narrative is a farrago of half-truths and fabrications.  If 
true, it would indeed justify Muslim rage against the crimes of the West.  But it deviates far from 
the truth, partly by making false claims, but, more important, by omitting basic truths whose 
absence renders the story false. 
 Not all claims in the al-Qaeda historical narrative are false.  The West did brutally colonize 
large parts of the Muslim world from the 1700s to the 1960s, does care more about the lives of 
Western citizens than Muslim civilians, does prop up Muslim autocrats, and does back Israel 
more or less unconditionally. 
 Other important allegations in the al-Qaeda narrative are untrue.  These include claims that 
the United States was largely responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (or 
more) under sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein between 1991 and 2003; engaged in 
predation against Muslims in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor; supported Russian and 
Indian cruelties against Muslims in Kosovo and Kashmir; and in a larger sense has sought to 
destroy Islam.  This portrayal grossly distorts the historical record.  The Western sanctions of 
1991-2003 allowed Saddam Hussein enough food and medicine to care for his people, but 
Saddam refused to distribute these resources.  Hence, the United States was only tangentially 
responsible for the suffering; Saddam was the main culprit.  The United States committed serious 
mistakes during its interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, but it intervened in each case to 
assist Muslims, not to harm them.  Its interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo ended Serb violence 
against those Muslim-majority populations, and its intervention in Somalia saved some 22,000 
Muslim Somali lives.82  The Western powers involved themselves in East Timor in 1999 to halt 
Indonesian brutality against the East Timorese, not to injure Muslims.  The United States has not 
supported Russian or Indian brutality in Chechnya or Kashmir and has not sought in any sense to 
destroy Islam. 
 Most important is what the al-Qaeda narrative omits.  It portrays the history of relations 
between Muslims and non-Muslims as a record of unprovoked one-way violence by non-
Muslims.  But the violence has in fact been a two-way street. 
 Western states have committed great cruelties against Muslim societies.  These include some 
crimes that al-Qaeda decries (Western efforts to subdue Muslim colonies, between 1700 and the 
1960s, as noted above), and some that al-Qaeda omits (the 1953 U.S. coup in Iran and a cynical 
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992 that left it in flames). 
 On the other hand, Muslim Sudan’s government has slaughtered two million non-Muslim 
South Sudanese since 1983, and it supported the murderous Lord’s Resistance Army’s rampage 
in Uganda until 2002.  Muslim Indonesia murdered 200,000 Christian East Timorese from 1975 
to 2000 and 400,000-500,000 of its non-Muslim Chinese minority in 1965.  Muslim Turkey 
massacred 600,000-1,500,000 Christian Armenians in the slaughters of 1895 and 1915, in one of 
the great genocides of modern times.83 
 Thus, the recent history of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is marred by great 
crimes committed by both sides.  Both have put themselves in the wrong by their brutal conduct.  
Accordingly, both should confess their crimes, hang their heads in shame and ask forgiveness.  
And both should temper their complaints against the other in the light of their own barbarism. 
 Islamist extremists also have much Muslim blood on their hands.  Their crimes include the 
slaughter of several hundred thousand Muslims in Darfur by Sudan’s Islamist government since 
2003; the killing of thousands of Afghan Muslims by Afghanistan’s Islamist Taliban government 
during the 1990s; the killing of tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims by the violent Algerian 
Islamist movement, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) from 1992 to 1998; and the killing of 
thousands of Iraqi Shia by Sunni extremists in Iraq since 2003.  Extreme Islamists posture as 
defenders of Muslims, but they have killed far more Muslims than have Americans, Europeans 
and Israelis in recent years. 
 In short, the al-Qaeda narrative leaves much to debate and correct.  To fail to address the 
narrative would leave a powerful rationale for supporting al-Qaeda in place.  What steps should 
the United States take? 
 
Debating the Narrative  
 The U.S. government should do what it can to amplify Muslim voices that dispute the al-
Qaeda narrative.  Toward this goal, the U.S. should give any useful assistance to Muslim leaders, 
scholars, commentators, schools, publishers and other institutions that challenge al-Qaeda’s 
ideology.  It must be recognized, however, that U.S. aid can undercut the credibility of its 
recipients with Muslim audiences. 
 The U.S. government should also build up its in-house knowledge on all matters related to the 
al-Qaeda narrative, so that its own people can debate that narrative effectively.  A U.S. 
government voice in this debate will be effective if it is backed by deep expertise. 
 Toward this goal, the U.S. government should establish a Civilization Dialogue Corps (CDC) 
to debate the theological and historical chapters of the al-Qaeda narrative.  The CDC would be 
based in the new State Department Bureau of Public Diplomacy (whose creation we 
recommended above).  It would comprise a few U.S. State Department officers who are deeply 
learned in Islamic law and theology, Muslim religious history, the political and social history of 
the Muslim world, and the history of Muslim relations with non-Muslims.  Preferably, CDC 
officers would speak a language of the Muslim world (e.g., Arabic, Pashto, Punjabi, Farsi or 
Indonesian).  To gain sufficient expertise, CDC officers will need months or even years of 
intensive special schooling.  Those specializing in Islamic law and history would need training to 
the level of respected Muslim scholars. 
 CDC officers would be prepared to explain how the al-Qaeda theological narrative departs 
from mainstream Islam, and to expose errors in its historical narrative, while granting truthful 
elements of the narrative and advancing a mainstream view of relevant history.  CDC officers 
would also lead in organizing and empowering voices in the Muslim world to dispute the al-
Qaeda narrative. 
 Clearly, Muslim communities will not accept CDC officers as authorities on Islamic theology 
or history, but will still listen mainly to their own authorities.  Even so, CDC officers will serve a 
valuable purpose.  At a minimum, their existence will stand as a visible gesture of respect to 
Muslims, demonstrating that the U.S. government cares enough about Muslims to become 
informed about them.  CDC officers will also calm Muslim fears that the United States is “out to 
destroy Islam” by showing an awareness that mainstream Islam and the West have important 
values in common (as President Obama argued in his Cairo University speech), and that al-
Qaeda’s theology is a perversion of Islam.  And in the long run, CDC officers will affect the 
terms of discourse among Muslims by pointing to facts or arguments that Muslims by their own 
research then find to be well-supported.  They may not persuade many Muslims directly, but they 
will spur useful discussions in which Muslims persuade one another. 
 To create CDC officers, the State Department could send a few of its Arabic, Pashto, Punjabi 
or Indonesian speakers to seminary to learn Islamic law or history.  It could recruit American 
scholars who are learned in Islamic law or history to work part-time representing the U.S. 
government in Arab/Muslim media and other Arab/Muslim forums, acting as a kind of “civilian 
reserve” and subject to being called up as needed.  Or it could recruit Muslim-world scholars who 
are willing to work openly for the U.S. government as full-time or part-time employees.  They 
would be available free to Mideast media, such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. 
 Some say that Muslims will never agree to debate their narratives with Americans, so there is 
no point preparing to join the discussion.  In fact, however, the U.S. government has denied itself 
the expertise needed to join the discussion.  At this point, the U.S. government knows too little 
about Islamic theology or history to have anything interesting or useful to say about them.  Why 
should Muslims want to have a dialogue with the ignorant?  When the U.S. government brings 
more expertise to the table, it will be more welcome.  It can make itself a legitimate interlocutor 
by paying its dues through study and learning. 
 As noted above, demagogues in the United States have sometimes made a sport of attacking 
foreign-service officers for moments of public candor.  But CDC officers cannot be effective if 
they fear being pilloried for doing their jobs.  They will need protection from such attacks. 
 
Create NGOs: Religious-Hate Watch, Myth Watch 
 The U.S. government should seek ways to bring into being new nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that will contest the al-Qaeda narrative and otherwise support U.S. goals.  
What is needed are two new “naming-and-shaming” NGOs — in the mold of Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, Transparency Watch and the Southern Poverty Law Center — to 
address harmful ideas around the world.  
 Existing NGOs have demonstrated that naming and shaming is effective.  States that abuse 
human rights or allow corruption fear criticism from these NGOs and sometimes improve their 
conduct to avoid it. 
 The new NGOs would name and shame in like fashion but for a new purpose: to expose and 
criticize the propagation of destructive ideas, especially ideas that support the al-Qaeda narrative.  
The success of these organizations would dampen harmful ideas around the world and thereby 
serve important American foreign policy goals.  The U.S. government cannot lead in creating 
these NGOs, but could inspire friends in civil society to make them happen. 
 Religious-Hate Watch would expose and censure the use of religious authority — God’s 
authority or the authority of a religious faith — for hate in every religious community.  It would 
monitor outlets for religious ideas across the world, including churches, mosques, synagogues, 
temples, religious schools and universities, religious print and electronic media, and the Internet.  
Its mission would include criticism of hateful scripture, which is found in every religion.  
Religious-Hate Watch would challenge religions to find a way to decommission hate scripture 
and make it a dead letter. 
 Religious-Hate Watch would also press religious communities to acknowledge wrongs that 
their faith has committed against others.  Experience shows that those who admit their own 
wrongs are far less likely to repeat them.  Accordingly, religious communities that acknowledge 
their past misdeeds will be less likely to abuse others.  Truth commissions have often served as a 
format for acknowledging wrong in the aftermath of civil conflict or human rights abuse, most 
famously in South Africa.84  Organized religions could be urged to follow this example and 
implement their own truth commissions.85 
 Religious-Hate Watch would not seek to limit others’ free-speech rights.  Rather, it would 
answer hate speech with speech of its own.  Monologues by religious haters would be replaced by 
dialogues that included voices critical of the haters’ message.  Purveyors of hate would find 
themselves sharing the podium with others, and their followers would hear both sides of the story.  
Thus, Religious-Hate Watch would create more, not less, free speech on religious/political 
issues.86   
 Five observations support the case for creating Religious-Hate Watch: 
     (1) The demon of hate-filled and violent religion is rising in the world.  Al-Qaeda’s violence is 
just one example of a wider menace.  Examples of other recent religious conflicts include civil 
wars in Sudan between Islamists and non-Muslims since 1956, civil war in Algeria between 
radical Islamists and secularists in the 1990s, war between Islamist Shia Iran and Sunni-ruled Iraq 
in the 1980s, civil war between Sunni and Shia in Iraq since 2003, the rise of religious motives on 
both sides in the Israel-Palestine and India-Pakistan conflicts in recent decades, the recent civil 
war in Sri Lanka between Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils, civil violence between the 
Islamist Taliban and others in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and a general rise of angry Christian, 
Jewish, Muslim and Hindu fundamentalisms in recent years.87    
     (2) Organized religions face little accountability for their actions.  A mechanism to hold them 
responsible for destructive conduct is needed.  
     (3) Moral criticism can improve the terms of debate in morally unhinged communities.  
Examples of communities that were transformed by moral criticism include the United States in 
the era of slavery and racist Jim Crow laws, the Soviet Union and the world communist 
movement after World War II, apartheid South Africa and the pre-Vatican II Catholic Church.  
The elites of these communities came to accept that their political or social systems or ideas were 
illegitimate partly because outsiders made criticisms that they could not answer.  Works like 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life 
of Ivan Denisovitch and First Circle helped demolish the moral case for slavery and communism.  
Similarly, criticism of religious hatred can help persuade religious communities to renounce it. 
     (4) Religious-Hate Watch could give Western voices another useful entry point into the intra-
Islam debate on theology.  It would define itself as a neutral body that holds all faiths to the same 
standard and includes members of all faiths in its leadership.  Accordingly, it would be hard for 
leaders of any faith to refuse dialogue with it.  Those who declined would reveal themselves as 
having no answers or something to hide. 
     (5) U.S. efforts to defeat al-Qaeda are damaged by non-Muslim religious extremism as well as 
Muslim extremism, because non-Muslim extremism fans Muslim extremism.  Extremist religious 
movements reinforce one another.  Each uses the threat posed by the other to mobilize its 
followers.  Islamic extremists exploit Christian and Jewish anti-Islamic rhetoric to whip up their 
followers, and vice-versa.  Christian pastor Franklin Graham, who famously termed Islam a “very 
wicked and evil religion,”88 and Osama Bin Laden are de facto allies.  They help keep each other 
in business.  It would therefore assist U.S. efforts against al-Qaeda to weaken extremists of all 
stripes, including Christian, Jewish and Hindu.  Hence, efforts that dampen hate in all religious 
communities would help the U.S. war — or dialogue — of ideas against al-Qaeda. 
 Reaching agreement on a working definition of religious hate will take effort.  The problem 
lies in finding a definition that is neither too broad nor too narrow.  For example, the question of 
religious exclusivism will pose a thorny issue.  Some argue that claims by any religion to be the 
only path to God are hateful, as they suggest that other believers are lesser people in the eyes of 
God.  But such claims are widely made by religious communities.  Thus, many Christians cite the 
words of Jesus in John 14:6, “I am the way; ... no one comes to the Father except by me,” as 
evidence that Christianity is the only path to God.89  Finding ways to address such beliefs without 
branding vast parts of the world as hateful will require care. 
 Myth Watch would expose and censure the purveyance of false chauvinist historical 
narratives by governments, political movements and other groups around the world.  It would 
serve the war/dialogue of ideas by deflating anti-American narratives worldwide and dampening 
or preventing conflicts that are fed by chauvinist narratives and become fodder for al-Qaeda 
propaganda. 
 Political leaders widely use self-justifying, self-glorifying, and other-denigrating historical 
narratives to mobilize public support for themselves and their programs.  Such narratives are a 
prime cause of conflict.  World Wars I and II were fueled by chauvinist historical falsehoods that 
fed toxic ideologies of victimization, helping to spawn aggressive foreign policies.90  Hitler rode 
to power on malignant lies about history and used these lies to justify his aggressions.          
 Such lies still play a pernicious role in many situations around the world today.  As discussed 
above, al-Qaeda inspires its followers with a fictional self-whitewashing, other-blaming victim 
narrative.  Israelis and Palestinians both embrace self-whitewashing, other-blaming narratives 
about their mutual history.  Such narratives also fueled Serb-Croat-Bosniak violence in the 1990s 
and stoke hard-line foreign-policy arguments in Russia and China today. 
 Since 1945, Western Europe has commonized the teaching of history under prodding from 
UNESCO and the Georg Eckert Institute of Brunswick, Germany.  Eckert and UNESCO 
sponsored an international dialogue about school history texts that helped narrow differences in 
the teaching of history across countries.91  An indigenous movement for historical truthtelling in 
Germany pushed German education still further in the right direction.  The success of these 
efforts goes far to explain why war is now unthinkable in Western Europe, and shows that 
malignant history can be revised by concerted action.  We should scale up the European insight 
and replicate it worldwide.  A Myth Watch should be established to preemptively contest 
chauvinist lies when they appear, before they cause conflict.92 
 The U.S national interest in deflating false historical narratives worldwide lies first in abating 
false anti-American narratives.  This would help the United States find more allies against al-
Qaeda.  The U.S. interest also lies in abating narratives that are not anti-American but cause war 
among others.  Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups feed on war, as we discuss below.  Hence, it 
is in the U.S. interest to prevent wars involving Muslims and, therefore, to deflate narratives that 
cause or sustain such wars.  
        
Strengthen U.S. Peacemaking 
 Al-Qaeda heavily exploits wars involving Muslims in its propaganda.  This propaganda 
features grisly images of Muslims suffering in strife-torn Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, 
Chechnya and Afghanistan and in past wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia.93  Al-Qaeda paints 
Muslims harmed in these wars as victims of Western cruelty, whether or not they were.  This 
war-fueled propaganda supplies al-Qaeda with one of its best recruiting devices. 
 Ending or abating conflicts involving Muslims should therefore be a central part of the war of 
ideas.94  Toward this goal, the United States should adopt a more muscular peacemaking policy 
toward conflicts in and around the Muslim world.  Specifically, it should move beyond mediation 
to a stronger policy of framing final-status peace plans and then using leverage to persuade 
belligerents to accept the U.S. plan.  Carrots would go to the peacemakers, while sticks would be 
applied to those who obstruct progress toward peace, as defined by their support or opposition to 
the U.S. peace plan.95  For example, regarding Israel/Palestine, the United States should 
reintroduce President Bill Clinton’s December 2000 final-status peace plan (known as the Clinton 
Parameters or Clinton Plan) and back it with carrots and sticks (mostly carrots) directed at both 
sides.  This could break the logjam and finally move the parties toward peace.  Polls have long 
shown that most Israelis and about half of all Palestinians favor peace on the terms framed in the 
Clinton plan.96  What’s been missing is U.S. leadership to pull them over the line. 
 The United States should help moderate Israeli and Palestinian leaders by promising that the 
U.S. government would provide incentives to their opponents for reciprocating concessions. 
Today, moderates on both sides hold back from offering concessions for fear of being hung out to 
dry, exposed as willing to concede but with no results to show for concessions.  U.S. pressure 
would lessen this fear.97 
 U.S. suasion for peace would also compel radicals on both sides to moderate their goals or 
risk losing support from their communities.  Today, extremists on both sides — Hamas, the 
Israeli settler movement and its Likud allies — pay no political price for depriving their 
communities of peace.  They can claim that “our radical actions aren’t preventing peace, as there 
would be no peace even if we behaved better.”  Hamas used this argument with success in its 
victorious 2005-06 election campaign.  Washington can prevent this game by making clear that it 
will lead the region to peace unless the radicals disrupt it.  Palestinians would then understand 
that Hamas really is preventing peace.  Hamas would then be forced to moderate or lose support. 
 Regarding India-Pakistan, the United States should frame an Obama Plan that defines a just 
final-status settlement to their conflict and back it with sticks and carrots.  The outlines of that 
plan are fairly clear.98  What’s missing is U.S. pressure to make the plan happen.  India and 
Pakistan have at times seemed ready to make peace themselves in recent years.  U.S. suasion 
might bring them to seal the deal. 
 Regarding Iraq, the United States should frame a grand bargain that defines how to settle the 
major outstanding issues: powers of the central government vs. the provinces; demarcation of 
provincial borders; sharing of control of state security services among groups; rights of provinces 
to organize militia; distribution of oil revenues; and the identity of Iraq (Arab or not).  The United 
States has been in Iraq long enough to know what formulas are most acceptable to the parties.  It 
should frame them and use leverage to persuade all the communities in Iraq to sign on.  The Bush 
administration blundered by meekly confining itself instead to mediation and cajoling.  The 
Obama administration should act more forcefully. 
 Is a muscular peacemaking policy of this kind feasible?  Yes, but the following problems may 
need to be addressed: 
     ▪ Muscular peacemaking would require  a flexible policy that directs U.S. support to 
whichever belligerent behaves better, and shifts support from one belligerent to another when 
their behavior changes.  But the U.S. government is often too rigid for this.  Instead, it sorts the 
world into white hats and black hats, which it then treats as permanent friends and permanent 
enemies.  It is not clear that Washington is capable of learning the more complicated habits of 
mind that muscular peacemaking requires. 
     ▪ Washington officials would have to agree on a U.S. peace proposal.  But achieving this 
agreement would often be challenging given that the belligerents will mobilize opposing lobbies 
in Washington to promote their cases, creating policy gridlock. 
     ▪ The U.S. government would need deep knowledge of the goals and perceptions of the 
belligerents.  But the State Department has few resources, and the wider American culture is 
insular.  As a result, Americans know little of the world and may be the wrong people to attempt 
difficult social engineering in faraway lands.   
     ▪ The United States would have to be a fair broker; muscular peacemaking fails if the United 
States pursues an unjust peace.  But past U.S. policies have sometimes been tainted by prejudice 
or ideology, or captured by foreign lobbies (like the China lobby of the 1950s and today’s Likud, 
Cuba, Taiwan, and Georgia lobbies) that seek their own parochial goals without regard to 
justice.99  These influences on U.S. policy must be kept at bay.  
 Muscular peacemaking may not succeed, but Washington should try it nevertheless.  The 
United States has a large national-security interest in peace and should run risks to pursue it, 
including the risk of failure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Al-Qaeda is a grotesque movement.  Its leaders preach hate against most of the world, 
including the vast share of the Muslim world that rejects their view of Islam.  They and their 
allies have murdered many thousands of Muslims and other innocents.  Their extreme Islamist 
political model has already been tried with disastrous results in Afghanistan, Sudan and Iran.  The 
al-Qaeda leaders are hiding in caves, with no state apparatus to amplify their message. 
 Such a movement should be easy to discredit and defeat.  Yet al-Qaeda has so far fought the 
world’s sole superpower to a stalemate in the worldwide struggle for hearts and minds.  As a 
result, U.S. prospects in the larger war against al-Qaeda are uncertain.  Together with its Taliban 
allies, al-Qaeda now threatens Afghanistan and has expanded its domain of control in Pakistan.  
From its redoubts in these countries it continues to threaten the wider world, including the United 
States.  Victory against al-Qaeda is nowhere in sight and will not be won until the United States 
changes the terms of debate in the Muslim world through success in the dialogue of ideas. 
 U.S. failure in this dialogue reflects a failure of strategy.  The past U.S. emphasis on 
monologue over dialogue and advocacy over objective facts, combined with an insufficiently 
respectful tone, often made U.S. public diplomacy ineffective.  U.S. leaders also failed to launch 
initiatives to directly contest the al-Qaeda narrative and deflate pernicious ideas that support it.  
 There is also a failure to commit sufficient resources to the task.  For many years, both the 
Congress and the Executive Branch have dismissed public diplomacy as unimportant, believing it 
deserved only a token amount of money and leadership talent. 
 The United States has suffered, and al-Qaeda has benefited, from these mistakes.  The U.S. 
government should now recognize that national security requires a capacity to shape debate 
abroad.  It should develop a sound strategy for this mission and commit resources that are 
appropriate to its vital importance.100 
 
The authors thank the Smith Richardson foundation and the Carnegie Corporation for generously supporting the 
research for this article. 
 
1 This article is informed by recommendations for improving U.S. public diplomacy offered by scholars and public-
policy practitioners in recent years, including Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, special eds., Public Diplomacy in 
a Changing World, special edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 
(March 2008); Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning 
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC, 2003, 
a.k.a. “The Djerejian Report”); William A. Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy,” Arab Media & Society 
(February, 2009); Mike Canning, The Overseas Post: The Forgotten Element of our Public Diplomacy (Public 
Diplomacy Council, December 1, 2008); William A. Rugh, Enabling Public Diplomacy Officers to Do Their Jobs 
(Public Diplomacy Council, December 20, 2008); William A. Rugh, ed., Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds 
through Public Diplomacy: A Report and Action Recommendations (Public Diplomacy Council, 2004); Leadership 
Group on U.S.-Muslim Engagement, Changing Course: A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World 
(U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project, 2008); Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan, A New Beginning: Strategies for a More 
Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World (CRS No. 7, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2005); 2005 Report of the 
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005); 2008 Report of 
the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2008); Kristin M. 
Lord, Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century (Brookings, November 2008); Hady Amr, The 
Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Arab World (Brookings, 2004); Finding 
America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy, Report of an Independent Task Force 
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, September 2003); and Report of the 
Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Defense Science Board, 2008).  Compendiums of 
recent writings on public diplomacy include Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, Routledge Handbook of Public 
Diplomacy (Routledge, 2009); and Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations 
(Palgrave, 2005).  A source of original documents on public diplomacy is J. Michael Waller, The Public Diplomacy 
Reader (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2007).  A survey of relevant history is found in William A. 
Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: The ‘Soft Power’ of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2006).  A broad statement on strategy that includes useful discussion of public diplomacy is Alice E. Hunt, 
Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl and Seth D. Rosen, eds., Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism 
(Center for a New American Security, June 2009). 
2  These figures are an average of the favorable percentage in each state, calculated from data in Andrew Kohut and 
Bruce Stokes, America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (Times Books, 2006), p. 
27.  On anti-Americanism, see also Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World 
Politics (Cornell University Press, 2007). 
3  Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World 
(Pew Research Center: July 24, 2007, retrieved from www.pewglobal.org), pp. 45-46.  Percentages of the public 
mentioning the United States as a threat: Bangladesh, 72 percent; Turkey, 64 percent; Pakistan, 64 percent; Indonesia, 
63 percent; China, 66 percent; Russia, 49 percent; Malaysia, 46 percent; Nigeria, 32 percent; and Brazil, 45 percent.  In 
each case, the United States was the most-mentioned threat.  Even larger shares of foreign publics expressed fear that 
the United States could become a military threat to their country in the future.  Expressing this fear were 93 percent of 
the public in Bangladesh, 85 percent in Indonesia, 81 percent in Malaysia, 77 percent in Turkey, 73 percent in Pakistan, 
65 percent in Egypt, and 63 percent in Kuwait (!).  Ibid., p. 59. 
4  Ibid., p. 52. 
5  Ibid., p. 45. 
6  Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, June 12, 2006, 
question 38; retrieved from http://pewglobal.org/ reports/display.php?ReportID=253.  Disbelievers that Arabs 
performed the 9/11 attack outnumbered believers by 41 to 16 percent in Pakistan, 59 to 32 percent in Egypt, 59 to 16 
percent in Turkey, and 65 to 16 percent in Indonesia.  Ibid. 
7  Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-
Nation Survey (Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007, retrieved from www.pewglobal.org), p. 22. 
8  “Egyptian Public to Greet Obama With Suspicion,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, June 3, 2009. 
9  Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007, pp. 57, 148. 
10  http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=mission. 
11  http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/12/shaikh.reward/index.html. 
12  On six major occasions since 9/11, foreign citizens “dropped a dime” to inform on al-Qaeda members or plots or 
other terrorist plots, leading to the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders, or thwarting of plots.  These instances 
include the captures of Ramzi Yousef and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), and the foiling of the 2006 al-Qaeda 
airline-bombing plot. The breakup of the 2006 attack is reported here: 
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=79154&d=12&m=8&y=2006.  Three additional instances 
include (1) the killing of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leader Hamsiraji Sali in April 2004 in the Philippines 
(http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhr393.html); (2) the capture of Indonesian terrorist leader Riduan Isamuddin (a.k.a. 
“Hambali”), arrested in 2003 in Thailand on a tip by a group member 
(http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/archive/2003-08/a-2003-08-19-1-1.cfm); and (3) the killing of Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2006 using data provided by a tip 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html).  Overall, more than 40 
sources have been paid by the U.S. government for tip-offs providing information leading to capture/killing of terrorists 
since 9/11.  These sources were paid for their information (a total of $62 million) but gaining reward money was not 
the only motive for the tips. http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/. 
13  U.S. officials assert that the shadowy S Wing of Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) gives 
money, military supplies and planning guidance to the Afghan Taliban.  Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Says 
Agents of Pakistan Aid Afghan Taliban,” The New York Times, March 26, 2009, p. A1. 
14  Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Ticking Clock,” The New York Times, April 6, 2009, p. A1. 
15  In March 2009, the Obama administration announced that it would increase U.S. pressure on Pakistan to end its 
support for the Afghan Taliban.  Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, “New Afghan Strategies for the U.S. and Its Foes: 
Obama to Add Even More Soldiers to Fight Militants,” The New York Times, March 27, 2009, p. A1. 
16  Robert O. Keohane and Peter Katzenstein, “The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism,” in Katzenstein and 
Keohane, Anti-Americanisms, p. 273-305 at 275.  Keohane and Katzenstein offer similar conclusions at p. 276, 286, 
287, 288, 295, and 304.  
17  As defined by the now-defunct U.S. Information Agency (USIA). 
18  The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent federal agency created in 1994 and run by a board 
of eight members appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, plus the secretary of state.  No more than 
four board members may be from the same political party.  The BBG oversees all non-military international U.S. TV 
and radio broadcasting. 
19  Mark Kilbane, “Military Psychological Operations as Public Diplomacy,” in Snow and Taylor, Routledge 
Handbook, pp. 187-200. 
20  Figures on U.S. public diplomacy spending directed at the Muslim world are dated and incomplete.  The Djerejian 
Report calculated in 2003 that the U.S. government spent $313 million on the following public diplomacy activities 
directed at Muslim-majority countries: $150 million on State Department public diplomacy activities, including 
exchange programs and salaries for State Department officials; $26 million for Radio Sawa in FY 2004; $37 million for 
Alhurra in FY 2004; and $100 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Djerejian Report, pp. 25-26, 
29-30.  Djerejian’s figures omit U.S. government spending on Muslim-language training for Americans who are not in 
government, and English-language training for Muslim-worlders.  Also, U.S. spending on public diplomacy worldwide 
rose from $1.3 billion in FY 2003 to $1.6 billion in FY 2008.  “A Smart Funding Strategy?” Appendix to Armitage-
Nye Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 24, 2009, Figure 6, from 
http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_congress&task=view&id=254.  Presumably, some of this spending 
increase was devoted to activities directed at the Muslim world.  If so, $400 million is a fair rough estimate for total 
U.S. public-diplomacy spending directed at the Muslim world in 2009. 
21  A valuable critical assessment of Alhurra’s programming is Philip Seib, Nick Cull and Patti Riley, An Evaluation of 
Alhurra Television Programming (USC Center on Public Diplomacy, July 31, 2008, at 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/research/project_detail/alhurra_tv_research_project/). 
22  Data on al-Jazeera viewership is from 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,  
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf.  Data 
on Alhurra viewership is from Dafna Linzer, “Alhurra Bleeding Viewers, Poll Finds, But Spending Is Up,” ProPublica, 
May 29, 2009, online at http://www.propublica.org/feature/alhurra-bleeding-viewers-poll-finds-but-spending-is-up-
529, quoting ibid.  Data on al-Manar viewership is for 2008 and is from 
http://www,brookings.edu/events/2008/~/media/files/events/2008/0414_middle_east/0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf. 
23  “Alhurra, the Free One: Assessing U.S Satellite Television in the Middle East,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 11, 
November 2005. 
24  Two capable U.S. officials were pilloried in recent years by conservative commentators and members of Congress in 
this fashion.  After a brief tenure, Larry Register was compelled to resign as director of Alhurra in June 2007 in the face 
of attacks by non-Arabic-speaking journalist Joel Mowbray in the pages of The Wall Street Journal.  Register had 
rankled the right by his efforts to improve Alhurra.  See Mark Lynch, “The Failure of Public Diplomacy,” 
guardian.co.uk, June 16, 2007; and Abu Aardvark, “Alhurra Controversy: One Good Thing,” 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/05/alhurra_controv.html.  In 2006, Alberto Fernandez, director of 
the State Department media office and the U.S. government’s single most effective media spokesman to the Arab 
world, was widely attacked by conservative commentators, including Andrew McCarthy of National Review Online 
and blogger Michelle Malkin, for acknowledging on al-Jazeera that U.S. policy in Iraq is not perfect.  Fernandez 
remarked, “History will judge American [policy] in Iraq.  We tried to do our best, but I think there is much room for 
criticism because, undoubtedly, there was arrogance and there was stupidity from the United States in Iraq.”  Fernandez 
followed this mild preamble with an argument for U.S. policies.  Nonetheless, a firestorm of criticism followed, and the 
Bush administration insisted that he recant his remarks.  See Dan Murphy, “Senior U.S. Diplomat’s Candor Gets Play 
in Middle East,” Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 2006; Abu Aardvark, “The Fernandez Problem,” 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/10/the_fernandez_p.html; and Craig Hayden, “The Fernandez 
‘StupidStorm’: Misunderstanding a Diplomat’s Candor,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy Blog, 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/061023_the_fernandez_stupidstorm_misunderstand
ing_a_diplomats_candor/. 
 Public-diplomacy scholar Marc Lynch notes, “I’ve been told by all kinds of old public-diplomacy hands that 
Public Affairs Officers live in fear of having some off-hand comment picked up, translated and sent back to 
Washington to kill their careers.” This “has a chilling effect on would-be public diplomats ... The partisan attack dogs 
who want to collect a scalp may care nothing about how this might affect the American national interest, but I hope that 
more serious people do.”  Abu Aardvark, “The Fernandez Problem.” 
25  In December 2006, only 10 U.S. foreign service officers in Baghdad had level 3 Arabic speaking and reading skills, 
and five more had level 3 Arabic speaking skills.  This tiny band of Arabic speakers is far too small for the need.  The 
United States has a large stake in the outcome in Iraq, and the U.S. government’s inability to staff its Iraq operation 
with appropriate language specialists shows that the shortage of U.S. Muslim-world language skills is acute.  “Only Six 
Fluent in Arabic at U.S. Embassy-Panel,” Reuters Alertnet, December 6, 2006, at http://alertnet.org 
/thenews/newsdesk/N06193252.htm. 
26  In 2008, the Department of Defense received $594.7 billion; the State Department received $17.5 billion.  Budget of 
the United States Government: Historical Tables: Fiscal Year 2010 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009): Table 
4.1, Outlays by Agency: 1962-2014, online at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/sheets/hist04z1.xls. 
27  Offering this argument is Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 32, 37-38. 
28  Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” pp. 43-44. 
29  In contrast, Switzerland successfully upgraded its global brand during 2000-07 with a campaign that rested on 
careful research on global public views of Switzerland.  Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” pp. 37-38. 
30  Leaders of the al-Qaeda camp where operative Omar Nasiri trained expressed more hatred of Shiites than of 
Christians or Jews, and voiced more hostility toward Iran than toward Israel or the United States.  Omar Nasiri, Inside 
the Jihad: My Life with Al-Qaeda (Basic Books, 2006), p. 179. 
31  The need for a new label for the “war on terror” is evident in the often-muddled U.S. public discourse about the 
identity of the terror threat.  Commentators conflate groups that pose vastly different levels and types of threat: al-
Qaeda, Iran, Hamas, Sunni insurgents in Iraq, Islamists, Hezbollah, Abu Nidal and other groups.  In November 2007, 
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney explained, “I don’t want to buy into the Democratic pitch, that this is 
all about one person, Osama bin Laden. ... This is about Shia and Sunni.  This is about Hezbollah and Hamas and al-
Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.  This is the worldwide jihadist effort...”  Perspectives: Bringing Light to 
Darkness, June 4, 2009, retrieved from http://www.perspectives.com/blog/archives/001533.htm.  Commentators also 
conflate the terror problems of other states (Israel, India, Russia and Colombia) with the U.S. terror problem, as if the 
United States had contracted to protect all regimes around the world from their local enemies. 
32  Discussions of the value of exchange diplomacy include Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” pp. 33-34, 40-42, 45-46; Nancy 
Snow, “International Exchanges and the U.S. Image,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 198-222; and Giles Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the 
Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations Theory,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 173-195. 
33  Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” p. 174. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” pp. 40-42. 
36  The George W. Bush Administration also cut VOA broadcast services in several important non-Muslim languages, 
including Russian and Hindi.  Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy,” p. 8.  These cuts should also be 
restored. 
37  Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arseneault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers 
of Public Diplomacy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 10-
30 at 18-19. 
38  Cowan and Arseneault, ibid., p. 19.  All U.S. public-diplomacy media are not in monologue format.  Starting in 
1994, the VOA announced an intent to move from “monologue to dialogue” and launched a range of call-in shows in 
more than a dozen languages.  They have been very popular.  Ibid., p. 18.   
39  Alternately, some of these officials might be housed in a quasi-independent agency that is insulated from immediate 
government control.  For example, Kristin Lord suggests that Congress create a USA-World Trust, a public/private 
nonprofit organization that would enjoy some political independence, akin to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
or the National Endowment for Democracy.  The mission of the trust would be to conduct important public diplomacy 
functions. Lord, Voices of America, pp. 17-30.  The Defense Science Board likewise recommends the creation of an 
independent nonprofit Center for Global Engagement to conduct public diplomacy functions.  Defense Science Board 
Report, pp. xiv-xv, 89-93. 
40  The success of public diplomacy campaigns often rides on the credibility of the messenger.  British public 
diplomacy toward the United States during 1939-41 was both credible and successful.  See Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” 
pp. 42-43.  In contrast, U.S. public diplomacy about Vietnam and Soviet cold-war public diplomacy lacked credibility 
and had little success.  Ibid., pp. 44-45.  Advocacy can sometimes succeed as well.  The Reagan administration 
persuaded Europeans to support theater nuclear-missile deployment in Europe in 1983.  Ibid., pp. 38-39.  But much of 
what the United States needs to convey in the war on al-Qaeda can be better conveyed by objective news presentation. 
41  On mismanagement at the BBG see Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy,” pp. 4-5. 
42  Much of the Taliban’s senior leadership graduated from the Haqqania school outside Peshawar, Pakistan, and 
students from a religious boarding school in Indonesia may comprise the core of Southeast Asian Islamist networks.  
See Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 80-81.  On the 
effect of madrasas, see also Jamal Malik, ed., Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror? (Routledge, 2008); and 
Saleem H. Ali, Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassahs of Pakistan (unpublished ms, 2005).  
On the education and the war on al-Qaeda see also Peter Krause, “Victory by Other Means: The Role of Education in 
Combating Islamic Extremism” (MIT, manuscript, 2007). 
43  The United States could also identify other institutions that spread extremist ideologies, such as publishers, press 
outlets or educational institutions, and take steps to reduce their access to funds or other resources.  Douglas Feith 
offers this suggestion, in line with the strategy outlined in National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1, 2006), pp. 4-7, 14, 18-19, 24-25. 
44  Arguing for reopening American Cultural centers is Canning, “Overseas Post,” pp. 11-13. 
45  Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning, pp. 36-37. 
46  Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
47  Djerejian Report, p. 66. 
48  Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning, pp. 49-50. 
49  “A Smart Funding Strategy?” Figure 6.  The total number of U.S. public diplomacy officers performing in overseas 
posts fell by over 60 percent — from over 7,500 to just over 2,800 — from 1967 to 1999.  Canning, “Overseas Post,” p. 
6. 
50  Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 
(Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2009, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf). 
51  Total U.S. defense spending was $613 billion in FY 2008 (excluding homeland security and veterans affairs), 383 
times total U.S. spending on public diplomacy. 
52  In FY 2003, the State Department devoted only one-quarter of its $600 million worldwide public-diplomacy 
spending to activities directed at Muslim majority states.  Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim 
World, Panel Says,” The New York Times, October 1, 2003.  The United States also spent $540 million on broadcasts 
by the Broadcasting Board of Governors in FY 2003 (ibid.), but data on the share of this $540 million that was directed 
at Muslim-world audiences is not available. 
53  Summarizing this leadership failure is Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy,” pp. 7-8. 
54  Discussing the special skills required for public diplomacy is Canning, “Overseas Post,” pp. 3-5. 
55  Offering this important suggestion is Rugh, “Enabling Public Diplomacy,” pp. 6-7. 
56  Offering this recommendation is Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy,” pp. 5-6, 9. 
57  Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning, pp. 3-4, 56-57, 62-63. 
58  On al-Qaeda’s ideology and narrative, valuable discussions include Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist 
Ideology and the War on Terror (Yale University Press, 2006); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred 
Terror (Random House, 2002); Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al-Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future 
(Brookings, 2008), pp. 24-36, 57-60, and 5-8; Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama 
Bin Laden (Verso, 2005); and Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical 
Islam, and the Future of America (Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 46-68. 
59  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 57-81, 162-63. 
60  The five pillars of Sunni Islam are affirmation of belief in God and of Mohammed as God’s messenger, prayer, 
charitable giving, fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca.  These duties are incumbent on every Muslim. 
61  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 109-110. 
62  Ibid., p. 110. 
63  Ibid., pp. 13, 21, 31-32, 107-122, 133, 164.  See also Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 46. 
64  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 113-116. 
65  Ibid. and Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, pp. 137, 203. 
66  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 111, 162-63.  On Qutb, see also Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 
62-68. 
67  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, p. 111. 
68  In 1998, quoted in Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, p. 59.  See also Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 122-
129, 131-133. 
69  In 2002, Abu Ghaith announced on an al-Qaeda-affiliated web site, www.alneda.com: “We have a right to kill 4 
million Americans — 2 million of them children — and to ... wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.”  Quoted in 
Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (Times Books, 2004), p. 12. 
70  Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,” 
Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 76-92.  See also Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, pp. 
65-68. 
71  Ibid., p. 67. 
72  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 21-22, 63-64, 110, 125, 157-58, 164, 166-167, 173; and Anonymous, Through 
Our Enemies’ Eyes, p. 65. 
73  On Taymiyya, see Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 42-52. 
74  As Mary Habeck notes, a prime goal of U.S. public diplomacy should be to make Muslim publics aware that al-
Qaeda approves the mass killing of Muslims.  Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, p. 173. 
75  Bin Laden claims that the United States “attacked us in Somalia,” where it “murdered and took possession of the 
land of Islam.”  Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 163; and “A statement from qaidat al-jihad regarding the 
mandates of the heroes and the legality of the operations in New York and Washington,” April 24, 2002, p. 2; 
downloaded from www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol10/alqaeda.html on 5/26/03. 
76  “A statement from qaidat al-jihad,” p. 1; and Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, p. 47. 
77  Osama bin Laden’s phrase, in “A statement from qaidat al-jihad,” p. 2. 
78  Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 163. 
79  Bin Laden wrongly alleges that U.S.-led sanctions on Iraq killed 1.5 million Iraqis after 1991.  Lawrence, ed., 
Messages to the World, p. 164. 
80  In 1996, Bin Laden also bizarrely blamed “the alliance of Jews, Christians and their agents” for unspecified 
massacres of Muslims in Burma, Assam, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, Eritrea, Tajikistan and a place bin Laden calls 
“Fatani” (perhaps a reference to Thailand’s Muslim-dominated Pattani province).  Lawrence, ed., Messages to the 
World, p. 25. 
81  The al-Qaeda film Will of the Martyr, quoted in Philip M. Taylor, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication,” in Snow and Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook, pp. 12-16 at 13. 
82  On lives saved and lost in Somalia, see Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for 
Success and Failure (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 59-60, Table 3.2.  He estimates that about 22,000 Somali 
lives were saved by U.S. action at the cost of some 625-1,500 Somalis killed by Western forces. 
83  A 1994 study of genocide estimated that 1.4 million Armenians were murdered between 1914-1918 by the Ottoman 
Turkish government.  See Rudolph J. Rummel, “Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 
31, No. 1, February 1994, pp. 1-10.  An introduction to this genocide is Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass 
Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 157-166. 
84  On the effectiveness of the South African truth commission see James L. Gibson, “Does Truth Lead to 
Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumption of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process,” American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2004, pp. 201-217.  On relevant history see James L. Gibson and Amanda 
Gouws, Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion (Cambridge University Press, 
2003).  A valuable discussion of the South African and other truth commissions is Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, “And the 
Truth Shall Make You Free: The International Norm of Truth-Seeking” (Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 2009). 
85  Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch suggests that organized religions could improve their conduct and relations with other 
faiths by adopting truth commissions.  Conversation with SVE, July, 2007.  Histories that form a useful starting point 
for a Christian truth and reconciliation commission include James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the 
Jews: A History (Houghton Mifflin, 2001); David I. Kertzer, The Popes against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the 
Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism (Vintage, 2002); Marvin Perry and Frederick Schweitzer, Anti-Semitism: Myth and Hate 
from Antiquity to the Present (Palgrave, 2002); Edward H. Flannery, The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty-Three Centuries 
of Antisemitism, rev. ed. (Paulist Press, 1999); Israel Pocket Library, Anti-Semitism (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974); and the 
2008 film Constantine’s Sword, which draws on Carroll’s book. 
86  Religious-Hate Watch would also forswear character assassination, instead debating others on the merits of their 
arguments. 
87  Arguing that a dangerous millennarianism is rising in all major faiths are Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred 
Terror, pp. 91-94, 419-446. 
88  B.A. Robinson, “Attacks on Muslims by Conservative Protestants: Graham, Hinn, Falwell, Robertson, Swaggart, 
and Baldwin,” Religious Tolerance, updated May 13, 2003, retrieved from 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/reac_ter18b.htm. 
89  Jesus is likewise quoted in Mark 16:16 declaring, “Those who do not believe will be condemned.”  Echoing these 
views is R. Albert Mohler Jr. of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary: “Any belief system” leading “away from 
the cross of Christ and toward another way of ultimate meaning is, indeed, wicked and evil.”  In 2003, quoted in Frank 
Rich, “A High-Tech Lynching in Prime Time,” The New York Times, April 24, 2005. 
90  A summary of the role of false history in causing World War I is Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 
1914,” World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, October 1985, pp. 80-117, at 93-95.  On historical mythmaking in Germany after 
World War I, see Holger H. Herwig, “Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War,” 
International Security, Vol. 12, No. 2, Fall 1987, pp. 5-44.  A general discussion of historical mythmaking as a cause of 
war is Stephen Van Evera, “Causes of War” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1984), pp. 393-
452. 
91  These commonizing efforts are described in E.H. Dance, History the Betrayer (Hutchinson, 1960), pp. 126-150.  
The results are described in Paul M. Kennedy, “The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970,” Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1973, pp. 77-100.  Also relevant are Nicholas Pronay and Keith 
Wilson, eds., The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies After World War II (Barnes and Noble Books, 
1985); and Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, eds., Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on 
Britain, Germany and the United States (Berg, 1987). 
92  The Eckert Institute and the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation in The Hague, Netherlands, now do 
valuable work toward commonizing the historical memories of selected parties in conflict around the world.  What is 
still needed is a more proactive institution that will preemptively audit historical narratives worldwide, contest 
chauvinist narratives before conflicts develop, and publicly censure mythmakers more aggressively. 
93  On the usefulness of the conflicts in Israel-Palestine and Kashmir to al-Qaeda, see Riedel, Search for Al-Qaeda, pp. 
136-147.  See also pp. 5-6, 11, 59-60, 129 on the importance of Israel in al-Qaeda thinking. 
94  Al-Qaeda also uses conflicts involving Muslims to train its followers in arts of war, to recruit, to raise funds and to 
build networks.  The United States should work to end such wars for these reasons as well.  Developing this argument 
is Stephanie Kaplan, who demonstrates in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war eases 
terrorist propaganda-making, recruiting, network-building, and training, and thus serves as a tonic for terrorist 
organizations.  She concludes that war prevention and war termination should be featured in U.S. counterterror policy. 
95  An enticing carrot could take the form of a security guarantee to parties that accept U.S.-defined peace terms.  An 
intimidating stick could be a threat to reduce security assistance to those who obstruct progress toward a U.S.-defined 
peace, or give or increase security assistance to their adversaries.  Discussing past U.S. efforts to make peace is 
Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Princeton University Press, 
2003). 
96  See polls of Israelis and Palestinians taken during 2004-2007, available at the Palestinian Center for Policy and 
Survey Research (PSR) at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2007/p26ejoint.html. In these polls Israeli support for the 
Clinton plan ranged from 52 percent (in December 2006) to 64 percent (in December 2004 and December 2005).  
Palestinian support ranged from 46 percent (in December 2005) to 54 percent (in December 2004). 
97  As he left office in fall 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert revealed his belief that Israel should make peace 
on terms like those of the Clinton Plan.  Specifically, he argued that Israel should withdraw from “almost all” of the 
West Bank and should share Jerusalem with the Palestinians.  See Uri Avnery’s column, “Summing Up,” October 4, 
2008, http://zope-gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1223200150/.  But Olmert feared to state these positions 
while serving as prime minister.  U.S. pressure for peace might have allowed him to lead Israel toward these goals 
while in office.  He could have had greater confidence that his steps toward compromise would bring reciprocal results 
from the Palestinians, as he would have known that Washington would use carrots and sticks to persuade the 
Palestinians to reciprocate. 
98  The most plausible outline for a settlement would have Pakistan agree to accept the line of control as the 
international border; in exchange, India would agree to stop stealing elections in Indian Kashmir and grant it greater 
autonomy. 
99  Some also argue that a peace imposed by outsiders will not endure because the belligerents have not freely agreed to 
it, will therefore not embrace it, and will return to war once they are free to do so.  The authors are not persuaded by 
this hypothesis but agree that it needs research. 
100  The George W. Bush administration did publish a public diplomacy strategy, U.S. National Strategy for Public 
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, in June 2007.  This document includes a number of sound recommendations 
but does not echo the themes we stress here: dialogue over monologue, objective facts over polemics, showing respect, 
and creating new U.S. capacity to contest the al-Qaeda narrative and to deflate pernicious ideas that support it. 
